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Christian Philosophy: Conceptions, Continuations, and Challenges begins with 
a thoughtful and reflective foreword by Nicholas Wolterstorff, where he 
writes that “The essays in this present volume are reflections on the state 
of Christian philosophizing after Plantinga’s issuance of his manifesto” 
(x). This is an apt introduction for at least two reasons: first, the impact of 
Plantinga’s “Advice to Christian Philosophy” is of central importance to 
this text, though the authors disagree about whether it should be viewed 
as largely positive, negative, or of mixed results; second, the topic of these 
works really is best understood as Christian philosophizing rather than 
Christian philosophy. To draw again from Wolterstorff’s introduction, he 
writes that “when one speaks of philosophy . . . one might have in mind 
the social practice of philosophy, or one might have in mind the thought 
and texts produced by those who engage in that practice.” This volume 
centers upon the former rather than the latter. The primary question ad-
dressed in this book is this: how ought Christians to do philosophy?
One notable feature of this collection is that, for the most part, it rep-
resents the perspective of continental philosophy. This is a refreshing and 
compelling departure from the typically analytic leanings of Christian 
philosophy. Continental philosophers will surely appreciate the variety of 
voices from their background, and analytic philosophers (like myself) will 
benefit from the challenges raised for analytic philosophy of religion. A 
handful of authors invoke a tone of derision and, at times, outright scorn 
towards analytic philosophy of religion, but they are the exception. In 
contrast, Bruce Ellis Benson’s chapter, “The Two-Fold Task of Christian 
Philosophy of Religion,” beautifully depicts the complementary nature 
of analytic and continental Christian philosophy. I found this chapter to 
be particularly inspiring. On the whole, this is a collection of essays that 
ought to be of interest to any Christian working in philosophy today.
This volume contains seventeen chapters, thirteen of which are origi-
nal to this book. J. Aaron Simmons introduces this work as having two 
broad aims: (1) “To survey where Christian philosophy has been and what 
it has become in the contemporary philosophical landscape; (2) To con-
sider what Christian philosophy should be and what role it should play 
in the future of philosophical inquiry” (14). I would add that nearly every 
chapter in this volume is concerned with one of the following questions: 
Is contemporary analytic Christian philosophy properly Christian? Is it 




properly philosophical? Is it perhaps hostile to, or ignorant of, continental 
strains of Christian philosophy?
This book is divided into three parts: Conceptions, Continuations, and 
Challenges. Part I begins with two previously published papers: Plant-
inga’s canonical “Advice to Christian Philosophy” and Jean-Luc Marion’s 
“Christian Philosophy: Hermeneutic or Heuristic?” Given how many of 
the papers in this anthology directly engage with the content of Plantin-
ga’s “Advice,” it is fitting that it is included in its entirety here. In Marion’s 
essay, first published in 2008, Marion argues that Christian philosophy 
ought to be understood not as a hermeneutic but rather as a “heuristic 
theory of charity” (48). This chapter accords well with the aims and mo-
tives of many of the contributors to this volume.
Chapter 3 stands out as exceptional. Here, Kyla Ebels-Duggan proposes 
that we view Plantinga’s advice for Christian philosophers “to ask your 
own questions” as a twofold project: we are to strive for autonomy from 
the philosophical community as a whole and for integrity as members of 
the Christian community. This chapter is clear, careful and compelling, 
and Ebels-Duggan’s careful consideration of what autonomy and integrity 
require is well worth a careful read.
Merold Westphal’s “Taking Plantinga Seriously: Advice to Christian 
Philosophers” comes next. Westphal challenges Christian philosophers 
to adopt “a priestly role . . . a prophetic role” He writes, “I am not sug-
gesting that there is something inappropriate about the role of philoso-
pher as apologist, only that we have other tasks we ought not to neglect” 
(81). In the process, Westphal urges Christian philosophers to reconsider 
their commitment to propositions and the role that theoretical reasoning 
plays in philosophy. By rejecting propositions, he hopes that “we will be 
reminded that our own God talk should not primarily consist in assert-
ing true ‘propositions’ about God, but in speaking to God in prayer, in 
praise, in confession, in gratitude, and so forth” (79). It is interesting to 
note that Westphal’s 1973 “Prolegomena to any Future Philosophy of Re-
ligion which will be able to Come Forth as Prophecy” is not included in 
this volume. Given that it is frequently referenced by other contributors to 
this volume, I would have appreciated its inclusion alongside Plantinga’s 
contemporaneous advice.
Chapter 5 is Benson’s “The Two-Fold Task of Christian Philosophy of 
Religion.” Like chapter 3, this paper stands out among the rest. Benson 
reflects on the ancient conception of philosophy as a way of life, noting 
that philosophy is a practical pursuit and a theoretical pursuit; “it is one 
task that takes two forms” (83). I cannot adequately capture the richness 
of Benson’s position here; I encourage all Christian philosophers to read 
it for themselves. The primary conclusion is this: continental and analytic 
philosophers of religion ought not to get too caught up in each other’s fail-
ings, but should instead see themselves as “engaged in a common project 
to which we are all contributors in different ways” (102). CPR might lean 
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towards the practical while APR leans towards the theoretical, but both 
are essential aspects of the two-fold task of Christian philosophy.
Part One concludes with Kevin Hart’s “Christian Phenomenology.” 
Hart writes that due to the nature of philosophical phenomenology, 
“There is no Christian phenomenology practiced in philosophy. Yet this 
claim does not preclude the possibility that the religion is itself phenom-
enological in one or more sense, and that knowing some philosophy helps 
one to see this” (107). Drawing upon the parables of Christ to present 
Jesus as phenomenologist, Hart suggests that Christian phenomenology 
is “an impulse within Christianity rather than philosophy” (108). Unfor-
tunately, this chapter includes a critique of analytic Christian philosophy 
that strikes me as something of a strawman. Hart writes that “Unlike most 
versions of Christian philosophy, Christian phenomenology begins with 
the testimony of Scripture” (112). He suggests that “Usually, but certainly 
not always, the views in play in analytic philosophy of religion are in-
formed neither by theology nor by biblical criticism; often they do not 
pay sufficient attention to Christianity as a concrete practice” (118). In my 
experience, these claims are just not true. Further, these criticisms are un-
necessary. Hart’s insights regarding Christian phenomenology are inter-
esting and compelling enough to stand on their own.
Part Two concerns what Simmons calls continuations of Christian phi-
losophy; here the discussion turns towards the future of the discipline. 
This section begins with Charles Taliaferro’s “On Divine Dedication: 
Philosophical Theology with Jeremy Taylor.” Taliaferro’s stated goal is to 
“extend the list of themes covered in Christian philosophy . . . to include 
the nature, value, and scope of dedications” (123). Drawing on the work 
of seventeenth-century Anglican theologian Jeremy Taylor, Taliaferro ex-
amines the impact of contemplative prayer on our perception of time. He 
quotes Taylor as writing that “God rewards our minutes with long and 
eternal happiness” and then goes further, suggesting that time spent in 
prayer can be, in some sense, a momentary experience of eternity (128). He 
concludes: “What I hope to have identified is how time itself can be a dedi-
catory good and that using it in dedicated, meditative, prayerful ways can 
set up a separable time frame as distinct from the many goods we may as-
pire to in ordinary temporality” (130). This discussion is novel, but brief; it 
felt a bit like the beginning stages of an interesting and compelling project.
Neal DeRoo’s “Discerning the Sprit: The Task of Christian Philosophy” 
follows. He argues that “the primary task of Christian philosophy should 
be discerning the ‘spirits’ of the age. Here, DeRoo references an aside from 
Plantinga’s advice, where Plantinga wrote that most disciplines are “ani-
mated by a spirit wholly foreign to that of Christian theism” (133). Plant-
inga noted that he did not “have the space here to elaborate and develop 
this point”; DeRoo sets out to do so. First, drawing on Husserl’s writing 
on the “spirit of Europe,” he articulates a notion of the “spirits” of an 
age. Second, he suggests an anthropology—inspired by Herman Dooye-
weerd’s—and unpacks the way in which this anthropology is both useful 
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for discerning the spirits of the age and wholly compatible with Christian 
conception of spirits—including the Holy Spirit. Finally, he “argue[s] that 
the task of philosophy, and especially Christian philosophy, is to discern 
the nature of these spirits as they are operative in human action, and try to 
clarify and articulate these spirits in a theoretical and systematic fashion” 
(143). By discerning and responding to the spirits of our age, Christian 
philosophers should be able to speak to the tensions between, for exam-
ple, “the West and Islam, the global North and the global South, and/or 
the 1 percent and the 99 percent” (145).
Chapter 9 is “Christian Philosophy and Disability Advocacy” by Kevin 
Timpe. In this chapter, Timpe draws four parallels between Christian phi-
losophy and disability advocacy: both are normative, hermeneutically situ-
ated, developmental and communal. Further, Timpe notes that they share the 
following feature: “Christian philosophy and advocacy are not just about 
arguments or truth claims (though they are about those); they’re about 
crafting and living out a vision that invites others to participate with us” 
(163). This well-crafted and persuasive chapter would be particularly use-
ful in a classroom setting.
As a person with deep commitments to the value of teaching philoso-
phy, I consider chapter 10 the highlight of this book. In “Teaching Evil,” 
Meghan Sullivan reflects on the substantial challenge posed by teaching 
the problem of evil, particularly as a committed Christian who neverthe-
less judges the problem of evil to be “a model for a successful philosophi-
cal argument” (165). She asks, “Am I intellectually committed to atheism 
but simply unwilling to quit my Mass-attending ways?” (165) In response 
to this challenge, Sullivan remarks that “a dialectical mismatch occurs when 
one side of the debate is able to state her argument in a short, plausible-
seeming and logically valid argument. But to refute any particular prem-
ise of the argument, the other side must appeal to a complex theory with 
difficult-to-transmit evidence” (166). The theist is in a position of dialecti-
cal mismatch with respect to the problem of evil. As a result, the prob-
lem seems simpler, more elegant, than any response. However, Sullivan 
introduces a number of analogous cases, noting that “we expect a bit of 
complexity in a theory of the nature of justice or a theory of the nature of 
truth. And as we investigate the details in the more complex responses, we 
observe systems that are beautiful and enlightening” (167). Accordingly, 
Sullivan advocates for and defends a particularist response to the problem 
of evil, one that draws heavily and unabashedly on particular Christian 
commitments.
Part Two concludes with Trent Dougherty’s “Advice for Analytic Theo-
logians: Faith Guided Scholarship.” I suspect that many readers, like my-
self, will be disinclined to take advice from this source.
The third and final part of this book addresses challenges to Christian 
Philosophy. The first challenge comes in chapter 12, J. Aaron Simmons’s 
“The Strategies of Christian Philosophy.” Simmons argues that “we now 
find ourselves in a situation where continuing to engage in Christian 
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philosophy, in the technical sense as laid out by Plantinga, is likely to be 
a problematic strategy” (191). Contrasting his own experience as a Chris-
tian student of philosophy with that of the fictional student in Plantinga’s 
address, he writes “My experience does not lead me to conclude in favor 
of the oppositional necessity that Plantinga and many other Christian 
philosophers seem to locate between something called ‘the philosophi-
cal community’ and something called ‘the Christian community’” (190). 
Instead, drawing heavily on Westphal’s 1973 “Prolegomena,” he proposes 
that “what is needed in the current situation is an approach that primar-
ily understands philosophy of religion as an attempt to foster expanded 
dialogue and relational engagement beyond any overly narrow construal 
of Christianity or philosophy” (200).
The second challenge comes in chapter 13 with Paul Moser’s “Chris-
tian Philosophy and Christ Crucified: Fragmentary Theory in Scandalous 
Power.” Here, Moser asserts that most Christian philosophy is Christian 
in name only, more accurately described as “mere theism” (210). In con-
trast, should we recognize the centrality of Christ’s crucifixion, we would 
see that “[true] Christian philosophy and wisdom are scandalous power 
but fragmentary in their theoretical reach” (212). The love and power of 
God are scandalous because, by submitting to death on the cross, Christ 
upends “the human power of domination” (215). They are epistemically 
scandalous as well, for “God’s ultimate evidence for self-revelation to hu-
mans does not rely on human arguments or any other source of human 
self-boasting or self-credit” (219). Finally, they are fragmentary because “At 
best, we ‘know in part’ and ‘see through a lens dimly,’ as candor in the face 
of unjust suffering makes undeniable. Where do our obvious intellectual 
limits leave Christian philosophy? In fragments, in the best scenario” (224).
J. L. Schellenberg’s “Is Plantinga-Style Christian Philosophy Really 
Philosophy?” comes next. Schellenberg’s thesis here is that, no, Plantinga-
Style Christian philosophy is not really philosophy. More specifically, these 
“philosophers” fail Schellenberg’s “Communal Condition: to be doing 
philosophy one must aim not just to solve certain fundamental problems, 
or contribute thereto, but to do so together with like-minded others in a 
shared enterprise leading to informed consensus” (232). The arguments in 
this chapter struck me as deeply implausible—despite Schellenberg’s be-
lief that his requirement “will, I expect, seem quite modest and intuitive to 
many” (232). There is a great deal more to be said about this, but William 
Hasker’s response to this objection in chapter 17, Meghan Sullivan’s defense 
of a particularist response to the problem of evil in chapter 10, and Graham 
Oppy’s competing conception of philosophy in chapter15 all do a far better 
job of undermining Schellenberg’s thesis than I could hope to do here.
In chapter 15, Graham Oppy’s “Philosophy, Religion, and Worldview” 
calls into question the triumphalist narrative of Christian philosophy. He 
reconceives Plantinga’s Advice as “Advice to Philosophers in general:” 
“The core of this advice, it seems to me, is that you should be authentic: 
you should embody your deepest values and convictions in the life that 
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you lead” (253). With that in mind, Oppy maintains that “There is no rea-
son to single out Christian doctrines for special attention: for every world-
view, there is a domain of inquiry in which a range of doctrines proper to 
that worldview are taken as antecedents in the conditional questions that 
frame that domain of inquiry” (258).
The final challenge comes in chapter 16 in Peter Ochs’s “Beyond Two-
Valued Logics: A Jewish Philosopher’s Take on Recent Trends in Christian 
Philosophy.” Just as Westphal seeks to undermine the Christian philoso-
phers commitment to propositions, Ochs expresses disappointment that 
the majority of Christian philosophers “uphold the hegemony of the 
modern model of logic and reasoning: practicing and promoting types of 
two-valued, propositional logic as the standard model of rationality even 
when applied to subjects toward which Christianity has privileged ac-
cess” (260). Instead, he advocates multivalued logic. This chapter includes 
a lengthy appendix, which he describes as “a sample of a more technical 
philosophical modeling of scriptural logic . . . a taste of how multivalued 
logics may be applied to help identify the reasoning that are indigenous to 
scriptural traditions or also cross-traditional practices” (279–280).
The book concludes with a chapter by William Hasker entitled “Re-
sponding to Challenges.” As the title indicates, Hasker adopts the role 
of defending Christian philosophy from the challenges raised in chapters 
12–16. Hasker’s treatment of each challenge is fair, clearly and carefully 
presented, and charitable—even when little charity has been given in re-
turn. His response to Simmons is the most lengthy, but his overall goal can 
be summarized as “to show that the two approaches [CPR and APR] are 
not as sharply opposed as Simmons sometimes seems to suppose” (298).
Hasker’s response to Moser is brief yet powerful, accurately depicting 
the core problems in Moser’s chapter. He notes Moser’s “apparent lack of 
appreciation for the work of other contemporary Christian philosophers” 
(296). Even more damaging, however, is the lack of any positive concep-
tion of Christian philosophy to be found in Moser’s criticism. “Instead of 
joining with them in common cause, he aspires to create a new discipline, 
or subdiscipline, of his own, one that he is as yet unable to describe in 
any positive fashion, except that it will not suffer from the defects that 
mar Christian philosophy as it now exists” (297). Hasker likewise deci-
sively addresses Schellenberg’s “Communal Condition,” concluding that 
“I think what we have here is a convincing case that we not only have 
not achieved, but are nowhere close to achieving, sufficient agreement 
to establish the Communal Condition as a necessary condition for any-
one’s qualifying as a philosopher” (293). Hasker’s responses to Oppy and 
Ochs include both a defense of Christian philosophy and a concession 
that certain aspects of the challenge ought to be taken up by Christian 
philosophers as part of “the challenge for a philosophical movement to 
engage with a question (or group of questions) that are of importance for 
the movement but are not receiving adequate attention” (289).
